The Quick Swerve

Question:

Emily is driving her car on a busy road when a pedestrian suddenly darts out into traffic. In an attempt to avoid hitting the pedestrian, Emily swerves sharply to the left and collides with Alex’s parked car. Alex files a negligence claim against Emily, arguing that she acted recklessly by swerving without checking her surroundings. Analyze whether Alex is likely to succeed in her claim.

Baseline Response

Issue: The issue is whether Emily can be held liable for negligence when she swerved to avoid the pedestrian, resulting in a collision with Alex’s parked car, and whether the sudden-emergency doctrine can shield her from liability.

Rule: The general duty of care in negligence cases is defined by the “reasonable and prudent person” standard. This requires individuals to act as a reasonable person would under similar circumstances to prevent foreseeable harm. The sudden-emergency doctrine allows an individual faced with an unexpected situation to respond without being held to the same level of scrutiny as in a non-emergency situation, provided they did not create the emergency themselves. In Posas v. Horton, the court emphasized that the sudden-emergency doctrine applies only when an actor confronts an emergency not of their own making and acts with reasonable care given the circumstances.

Application: Emily, as a driver, owed a duty of care to other road users, including Alex, to act in a manner that would prevent foreseeable harm. Swerving sharply to avoid a pedestrian can be considered an instinctive reaction to an immediate danger. In assessing her response, it must be determined whether her action aligns with what a reasonable driver would do when faced with a sudden, unforeseen threat. If her actions were proportionate and did not show reckless disregard for others, the sudden-emergency doctrine might apply. The situation as described aligns with the court’s reasoning in Posas v. Horton, where an emergency must confront the actor, and reasonable care in the moment must be established.

Counterarguments: Alex might argue that Emily’s response was disproportionate or that she failed to consider safer alternatives. He could contend that a reasonable driver would have braked instead of swerving, which might have avoided the collision. Additionally, if there is evidence showing that Emily could have foreseen the risk posed by the pedestrian before reacting, the sudden-emergency doctrine might not apply, as it would indicate she contributed to creating the emergency.

Conclusion: Emily is unlikely to be held liable under the sudden-emergency doctrine because her sharp swerve to avoid the pedestrian appears to be a reasonable and instinctive response to a sudden, unforeseeable threat. Courts have recognized that in emergencies not of one’s own making, an individual’s actions are judged based on what a reasonable person would do under similar circumstances. As long as Emily’s reaction was proportionate and did not exhibit reckless disregard for others, Alex’s claim is likely to fail.