Ramos v Baig, 2016 NY Slip Op 08216 [145 AD3d 696]

December 7, 2016

Appellate Division, Second Department

[*1]

Gaby Ramos, Plaintiff,

v

Intiyaz M. Baig et al., Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents. Tiffany N. Nelson et al., Third-Party Defendants-Appellants.

Pillinger Miller Tarallo, LLP, Elmsford, NY (Jeffrey E. Bollinger of counsel), for third-party defendants-appellants.

Baker, McEvoy, Morrissey & Moskovits, P.C. (Marjorie E. Bornes, Brooklyn, NY, of counsel), for defendants/third-party plaintiffs-respondents.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the third-party defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lane, J.), entered October 9, 2014, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the third-party defendants for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint is granted.

In this three-vehicle motor vehicle accident, a vehicle operated by the plaintiff Gaby Ramos stopped to make a left turn and was struck in the rear by a taxi operated by the defendant third-party plaintiff Intiyaz M. Baig and owned by the defendant/third-party plaintiff Begonia Taxi, Inc., sued herein as Begonig Taxi, Inc. (hereinafter together Begonia). At a certain point, the Ramos vehicle struck the rear of a vehicle operated by the third-party defendant Tiffany N. Nelson and owned by the third-party defendant Carmella Browder. As relevant to this appeal, the Supreme Court denied the third-party defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint. We reverse.

In support of their motion, the third-party defendants established, prima facie, that they did not contribute to the happening of the accident and that the Ramos and Begonia vehicles were the proximate causes of the accident ( see Orellana v Maggies Paratransit Corp ., 138 AD3d 941 , 942 [2016]; Tsang v New York City Tr. Auth ., 125 AD3d 648 [2015]; Drakh v Levin , 123 AD3d 1084 , 1085 [2014]). The third-party defendants submitted evidence demonstrating that their vehicle came to a gradual stop at the subject intersection in order to make a left turn and was stopped for at least 10 seconds before it was allegedly struck in the rear by the Ramos vehicle.

In opposition, Begonia failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Begonia’s contention that the third-party defendants’ vehicle came to a sudden stop was conclusory and insufficient, in and of itself, to provide a nonnegligent explanation for the rear-end collision ( see Bene v Dalessio , 135 [*2] AD3d 679, 680 [2016]; Gavrilova v Stark , 129 AD3d 907 , 908-909 [2015]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the third-party defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint. Rivera, J.P., Austin, Hinds-Radix and Maltese, JJ., concur..