Two separate inquiries are required to determine the greater interest: (1) what are the significant contacts and in which jurisdiction are they located; and, (2) whether the purpose of the law is to regulate conduct or allocate loss. Here, both parties are domiciled in New York and the tort occurred in Vermont. No-fault and at-fault insurance laws are loss-allocating rules, i.e., rules that prohibit, assign, or limit liability after the tort occurs. Where the conflicting rules at issue are loss allocating and the parties to the lawsuit share a common domicile, the loss allocation rule of the common domicile will apply. Padula v. Lilarn Properties Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 519 (1994). See also Claude v Autobus Fleur De Lys, Inc., 166 A.D.3d 1120 (2018).

“As a general rule evidence of unconnected, uncharged criminal conduct is inadmissible if offered for no other purpose than to raise an inference that a defendant is of a criminal disposition . . . but such evidence may be admissible if offered for some relevant purpose. . . . [Generally]  speaking, evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime charged when it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others; (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial." People v Vails, 43 NY2d 364, 368 (1977).

“The State right to counsel attaches indelibly in two situations. First, the right attaches indelibly upon the commencement of formal proceedings, whether or not the defendant has actually retained or requested a lawyer. . . . Second, the right to counsel attaches indelibly where an uncharged individual has actually retained a lawyer in the matter at issue or, while in custody, has requested a lawyer in that matter.” People v. West, 81 NY2d 370, 373-374 (1993).

“If an action is timely commenced and is terminated in any other manner than by  a voluntary discontinuance, a failure to  obtain  personal  jurisdiction over  the  defendant,  a  dismissal  of  the  complaint  for  neglect to  prosecute  the  action,  or  a  final  judgment  upon  the  merits,  the plaintiff,  or, if the plaintiff dies, and the cause of action survives,  his or her executor or administrator, may commence a new action upon the  same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or  occurrences within  six  months  after  the termination provided that the new action  would have been timely commenced at the  time  of  commencement  of  the prior  action  and  that  service upon defendant is effected within such six-month period.” CPLR § 205 (2015).

“A promise in writing and signed by the promisor or by his agent shall not be denied effect as a valid contractual obligation on the ground that consideration for the promise is past or executed, if the consideration is expressed in the writing and is proved to have been given or performed and would be a valid consideration but for the time when it was given or performed.” GOL § 5–1105.