Delgado-Lara v Szozda, 2024 NY Slip Op 04543 [230 AD3d 1294]
September 25, 2024
Appellate Division, Second Department
[*1]
Andres Delgado-Lara, Appellant,
v
Mieczyslaw Szozda, Respondent.
Michael N. David, New York, NY (Michael B. Thomas, Jr., of counsel), for appellant.
John Trop (Sweetbaum & Sweetbaum, Lake Success, NY [Joel A. Sweetbaum], of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Denis J. Butler, J.), entered April 18, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident is denied.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The defendant moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the accident. In an order entered April 18, 2023, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted that branch of the motion. The plaintiff appeals.
The defendant failed to meet his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the accident ( see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys. , 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler , 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendant’s submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding the plaintiff’s claims, set forth in the bill of particulars, that he sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) ( see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff , 90 AD3d 969 [2011]; Rouach v Betts , 71 AD3d 977 [2010]; see also Richards v Tyson , 64 AD3d 760 , 761 [2009]).
Since the defendant failed to meet his prima facie burden, it is not necessary to determine whether the submissions by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § [*2] 5102 (d) as a result of the accident ( see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr. , 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; Che Hong Kim v Kossoff , 90 AD3d at 969).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the accident.
In light of our determination, we need not reach the parties’ remaining contentions. Connolly, J.P., Genovesi, Dowling and Ventura, JJ., concur..