Commissioner of the N.Y. State Dept. of Transp. v Polite, 2024 NY Slip Op 06024 [233 AD3d 645]
December 4, 2024
Appellate Division, Second Department
[*1]
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Transportation et al., Respondents,
v
Bryan A. Polite et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.
Lippes Mathias LLP, Buffalo, NY (Carol E. Heckman and James P. Blenk of counsel), for appellants.
Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany, NY (Jeffrey W. Lang and Jonathan D. Hitsous of counsel), for respondents.
In an action, inter alia, to enjoin the construction and operation of certain structures and for related declaratory relief, the defendants Bryan A. Polite, Launcelot A. Gumbs, Seneca Bowen, Daniel Collins, Sr., Germain Smith, Donald Williams, Jr., and Linda Franklin appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Carmen Victoria St. George, J.), dated July 14, 2022. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those defendants’ motion, denominated as one for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them, but which was, in actuality, one for leave to reargue their prior motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them, which had been denied in an order of the same court (Sanford Neil Berland, J.) dated May 18, 2020.
Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as no appeal lies from an order denying reargument.
The underlying facts of this action are summarized in our opinion and order on a related appeal ( see Commissioner of the N.Y. State Dept. of Transp. v Polite , — AD3d —, 2024 NY Slip Op 06023 [2024] [decided herewith]).
The motion of the defendants Bryan A. Polite, Launcelot A. Gumbs, Seneca Bowen, Daniel Collins, Sr., Germain Smith, Donald Williams, Jr., and Linda Franklin, although denominated as one for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them on the grounds of sovereign immunity and failure to join a necessary party, was, in actuality, under the circumstances presented here, a motion for leave to reargue their prior motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them on the same grounds, which had been denied in an order that is the subject of the related appeal. As the denial of a motion for leave to reargue is not appealable, the appeal must be dismissed ( see Brilliantine v East Hampton Fuel Oil Corp. , 221 AD3d 951 , 952 [2023]; Cronin v Hudson Chelsea Assoc., LLC , 68 AD3d 913 [2009]; Lapadula v Sang Shing Kwok , 304 AD2d 798 [2003]). Connolly, J.P., Maltese, Dowling and Warhit, JJ., concur..